Journal of Philosophical Investigations

The Problem of Truth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Mohammad Reza Abdollahnejad; Khadije Gholizadeh

Volume 13, Issue 27 , September 2019, , Pages 187-212

https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2019.34948.2367

Abstract

The absence of a separate entry or section on “truth” in the Critique of Pure Reason, the presence of some ambiguous, complicated and problematic-interpretable expressions ... Read More The absence of a separate entry or section on “truth” in the Critique of Pure Reason, the presence of some ambiguous, complicated and problematic-interpretable expressions and utterances in some parts of that work, and the formation of some extreme contradictory interpretations concerning these utterances on the part of some of Kant’s commentators, are the most important obstacles encountered by contemporary Kantian scholars in presenting a unitary, coherent and transparent view of Kant’s theory of truth. Hence, the question about the nature of truth in Critique of Pure Reason has become a fundamental problem among Kantian scholars. The present paper, without undue adhering to one of the two extreme common interpretations on Kant’s theory of truth (which one of them has considered Kant to be advocate of traditional correspondence theory of truth and the other has taken him as the founder of coherence theory of truth), and only by analyzing Kant’s new conception of “judgment” as an epistemic (and not logical) relation between representations emphasizes this important point that the general structure of Critique of Pure Reason requires that the traditional correspondence theory of truth not be entirely abandoned and not completely preserved in its traditional form. In other words, by revising and completing the traditional correspondence theory of truth, the Critique established the foundations of a new conception of truth that can be called “transcendental correspondence theory of truth”. According to this new conception, truth is a condition without which a judgment or cognition cannot correspond with its object and consequently cannot have objective validity; The constituent representations of a judgment could become true knowledge or objective empirical judgment only when they are synthesized in accordance with possible experience (i.e. universal a priori rules or principles of experience).

Metaphysics of Logical Realism

Mohammadreza Abdollahnejad

Volume 9, Issue 17 , December 2015, , Pages 1-21

Abstract

Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical ... Read More

چگونه استراوسن میان معرفت‏شناسی، هستی‏شناسی و منطق وحدت ایجاد می کند؟

Mohammad Reza Abdollahnejad

Volume 6, Issue 11 , November 2012, , Pages 1-14

Abstract

تحلیل استراوسن نوعی «تحلیل زبانی پیوندگرا» است. او بر پایه این نوع تحلیل به گستره وسیعی از مفاهیم ... Read More

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Author = Abdollahnejad, Mohammad Reza

The Problem of Truth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Abstract

Metaphysics of Logical Realism

Abstract

چگونه استراوسن میان معرفت‏شناسی، هستی‏شناسی و منطق وحدت ایجاد می کند؟

Abstract